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Abstract:
Leaving home is regarded as one of the key markers of the transition to adulthood. Previous 
studies have shown that the degree to which labour market vulnerability affects decisions 
about leaving the parental home and forming a family differs across countries and across 
different welfare state regimes. In countries that provide more generous supports for youth, 
the impact of labour market weakness on housing autonomy is reduced. Still, it remains 
unclear what dimensions of the institutional setting may be most important when it comes to 
buffering the relationship between labour market insecurity and individual autonomy among 
young people. 
Against this background, the paper uses multilevel models to investigate whether and how 
passive labour market policies and the structure of the housing market can moderate the 
relationship between labour market exclusion and youth housing autonomy. 
The results show that the level of expenditure on passive labour market policies, as well as the 
level of coverage of these policies, do not play a moderating role on the association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy, suggesting that further investigation in this domain 
would benefit from the inclusion of qualitative information on the design of passive measures. 
On the contrary, the structure of the housing market shows a positive role, although relatively 
low, in moderating the association between unemployment and housing autonomy, together 
with a negative moderating role of the level of indebtedness of the households. These findings 
shed light on the domains where policy intervention might provide better returns when it 
comes to fostering the achievement of housing autonomy for youth.
  
Keywords: autonomy, transition, adulthood, housing market, passive labour market policies, 
mortgage market.
1. Introduction
The paper investigates the relationship between labour market exclusion and youth housing 
autonomy, focusing on some specific institutional configurations that can moderate this 
relationship: passive labour market policies and the housing market. Literature states that country 
differences in labour market and welfare state have an impact on the decision to leave home for 
unemployed young people or young people working with temporary contracts. Indeed, due to recent 
developments in modern labour markets, youth are disproportionally affected by unemployment 
and temporary employment as compared to prime-age workers (Bell & Blanchflower, 2011; Müller 
& Gangl, 2003; O’Higgins, 2012). This can affect the young people’s possibility to manage the cost 
of owing, renting or buying a house, in order to leave the parental home. At the same time, 
labour market exclusion affects the possibility of young people living independently to manage 
housing expenses in case of low income or unemployment, posing the risk of losing their housing 
autonomy.
However, despite the growing literature on the problem of housing affordability for household 
budgets, in particular in case of young people, there is a lack of studies that investigate the 
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moderating effect of the configuration of the housing market. 
Moreover, we also take into consideration the moderating effect of passive labour market 
policies, an important economic institutional support for young people with low or no income. 
The accessibility and generosity of passive labour market policies may moderate the negative 
association between unemployment and housing autonomy by providing unemployed youth with 
economic resources to manage the costs of housing, thus enhancing their transition to or their 
chances of remaining in independent living.
In the paper we test two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is about the moderating effect of expenditure 
in passive labour market policies on the relationship between unemployment and housing 
autonomy. We expect that the more generous the unemployment protection (both in expenditure 
and in coverage), the weaker the negative effect of unemployment on housing autonomy (thus 
positively moderating the association between labour market exclusion and housing autonomy). 
Hypothesis 2 tests the moderating role of the housing and mortgage market on the relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy. We expect that the higher the share of the rental 
market of the total housing market, the lower the negative impact of unemployment on housing 
autonomy. Similarly, the easier the access to mortgage is, the weaker the impact of unemployment 
on housing autonomy will be (thus positively moderating the association between labour market 
exclusion and housing autonomy).
We analyse such a moderating effect using two-step multilevel modelling, which includes as a 
first step the analysis of EU-SILC individual data and a second step using macro-level data from 
Eurostat, OECD and the European Mortgage Federation. The analyses highlight that the level of 
expenditure in a country on passive labour market policies does not seem to affect the association 
between labour market exclusion and housing autonomy. However, results highlight that the 
structure of the housing market may play a moderating role, although to a limited extent, which 
is either positive or negative, depending on the configuration taken. Our findings suffer of some 
limitation, nonetheless, they offer an interesting exploration of the contribution of some policy 
decisions when considering whether to foster the housing autonomy of young people.
The paper is organized as follows. The next paragraph frames the analyses of the previous 
literature, highlighting its innovative perspective. Paragraph 3 illustrates the research design: 
hypotheses, data and method of analysis. The findings are presented in Paragraph 4, followed by 
some conclusive observations (Par.5).
2. Theoretical background
Countries differ significantly in the extent to which they provide security against potential job 
loss and unemployment (Ebralidze, 2011; Gallie, 2010). Specific institutional configurations of the 
labour market and welfare state, as well as macro-structural conditions, are relevant explanations 
for country differences (Müller & Gangl, 2003) and for their impact on the decisions of leaving 
home among unemployed young people. 
We expect that regulation and social policies filter the impact of increasing labour market exclusion 
and job insecurity for young people (Blossfeld, Buchholz, Hofäcker, & Bertolini, 2012; Mills & 
Blossfeld, 2003), and that can have an impact on their decisions about leaving their parental home 
(Bertolini, 2012; Bertolini, Hofäcker & Torrioni, 2014). Indeed, institutional factors such as the level 
of income security provided in case of job loss and a flexible mortgage market, can mediate the 
relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy. 
As the literature points out, the availability of universal unemployment protection can influence 
peoples' propensity for leaving the parental home because they can count on income continuity, 
even if they work with precarious contracts or even if they are unemployed, so that they can 
still afford the housing expenses. Thus, generous expenditure on passive labour market policies 
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may positively moderate the relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy by 
guaranteeing income continuity in case of job loss, thus providing resources for supporting the 
costs of autonomous living. 
Finally, empirical research highlighted that the structure of the housing and mortgage market can 
also play a role in moderating the relationship between unemployment and housing autonomy. 
Indeed, where housing is affordable, bearing the costs of housing, even in case of job loss, 
becomes less challenging than in countries where rules to access to credit are strict and the 
market for affordable dwellings is lacking. Research on cross-national differences in the rate of 
homeownership across European countries showed that housing markets have some peculiar 
features within each country, which can moderate the relationship between unemployment 
and residential autonomy (Filandri, 2016). First, where homeownership is widespread, such as in 
Southern Europe or in Eastern Europe, renting is not considered to be an efficient solution due 
to the home ownership culture (Holdsworth & Solda, 2002), and it is made difficult by the very 
structure of the housing market. In addition, in these countries youth are often excluded from 
homeownership due to constraints in accessing the mortgage market and due to a limited rental 
sector, which offers little choice and high prices. 
Moreover, the presence of differentiation in the housing market can play a crucial role in the 
(negative) relationship between the lack of employment and housing autonomy: young people 
in tertiary education or in early job careers need to have a different housing market than older 
and more established people (Addabbo & Kjeldstad, 2013; Ford, Rugg, & Burrows, 2002; Sandlie, 
2011). Younger households may have substantially different patterns of leaving home if they act in 
mature and dominant home ownership sectors or in a more rapidly developing society, in which 
traditional housing practices mix with nascent private market developments (Bugeja-Bloch, 2012). 
For this reason, in Mediterranean countries young people tend to leave their original families much 
later than in the rest of Europe, also because of the insufficient supply of affordable dwellings 
(Baldini & Poggio, 2012; Mencarini & Tanturri, 2006; Mulder & Billari, 2010). Lower affordability is 
a key factor affecting the ability to leave home, and its effect is stronger in the presence of low 
investments into social housing (Bugeja-Bloch, 2012). 
Leaving the parental home is a complex decision-making process, bringing into play many 
rational-economic elements, as well as cultural and institutional-related ones. The importance 
of macro and meso-level dimensions must be underlined in the structure of the constraints and 
opportunities within which young people are confronted in their paths towards housing autonomy 
(Baranowska-Rataj et al., 2015). At the macro level, we refer to the characteristics of welfare, 
labour and the housing market, social norms and cultural models, as well as to the structure of 
resources and inequalities related to family and social network at the meso level; finally, we refer 
to the individual situation as well as the decision-making mechanisms and strategies implemented 
at the micro level in the context of reference.
For the purpose of this analysis, it is appropriate to consider the assumption of economic rationality 
to explore the impact of welfare and housing regimes on the decision to leave home. We assume 
that in this decision the individual acts on the basis of a limited rationality and chooses a function 
of utility that satisfies, but doesn’t maximize its own preferences, or introduces cultural norms 
into the cost/benefit calculation of such utility function. For example, among the scholars who 
have researched transition to adult life, Blossfeld & Prein (1998) think that rational-instrumental 
behaviour can co-exist with behaviour guided by norms.
Recently, in most countries the credit market has changed in different directions, becoming more 
or less accessible, depending on the degree of risk aversion in the economic environment and in 
the banking sector. The literature has highlighted that there is a negative correlation between the 
size of the mortgage market and the proportion of homeownership: higher levels of mortgage debt 
are seen as an indicator of less difficulties in buying houses (Aalbers, 2009; Filandri, 2016; Schwartz, 
2013), while high rates of homeownership with a small mortgage market tend to exclude the 
youth. In this context, renting may also be difficult: the initial transition out of the parental home 
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is heavily dependent on the availability of certain kinds of housing, and the availability of a cheap, 
broad, and flexible rental market can make leaving the parental home more affordable. 
Given this framework, we expect that a favourable structure of the housing market, characterised by 
a wide rental sector and/or an accessible mortgage market can positively moderate the relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy. Indeed, individuals with weak employment 
positions or low attachment to the labour market often do not possess sufficient resources to 
buy a home, and they encounter difficulties in finding accommodations with reasonable rent 
(Holdsworth & Solda, 2002; Jones, 1995; Filandri, 2016). If the housing market is characterised by a 
high supply of houses for rent and by a well-developed mortgage market, we can expect that the 
negative effect of unemployment on housing autonomy decreases, i.e. is positively moderated by 
the fact that reliance on income from employment is made less urgent, since access to housing 
is more affordable. Nonetheless, the effect of a high level of indebtedness due to housing may 
also have the opposite effect if we consider that recent literature has highlighted the difference 
between purchase affordability and repayment affordability (Gan & Hill, 2009; Filandri, 2016). The 
former refers to the ability to purchase a house thanks to access to an adequate mortgage, while 
the former refers to the ability of the individual to repay the mortgage. The deregulation of the 
credit market, which has taken place in recent years, has led to a positive impact on purchase 
affordability, making access to mortgage easier. However, this does not have any relationship with 
the ability of the individual to repay the debt (repayment affordability). Indeed, extending access 
to credit also to individuals with lower income also implies increasing the risks associated with 
home ownership (Filandri, 2016). 
Based on the literature presented in the previous section, we formulated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The moderating role of passive labour market policies on the relationship between 
unemployment and housing autonomy: the more generous the unemployment protection is (both 
in expenditure and in coverage), the weaker the negative effect of unemployment on housing 
autonomy is (positively moderating the association between labour market exclusion and housing 
autonomy). 
We expect that in countries where the investment in passive LMPs is higher, the negative 
relationship of unemployment on residential autonomy decreases. In fact, unemployment benefits 
help to guarantee a continuity of income, even if people are unemployed. This can support young 
people in making their decision to leave the parental home and to take on the responsibility of the 
regularly paying rent or mortgage for a new house.
Hypothesis 2. The moderating role of the housing and mortgage market on the relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy: the higher the share of the rental market is 
of the total housing market, the lower the impact of unemployment on housing autonomy will 
be. Similarly, the easier the access is to mortgage, the lower is the impact of unemployment on 
housing autonomy (positively moderating the association between labour market exclusion and 
housing autonomy).
We expect a positive moderating role of the share of the rental sector on the relationship between 
unemployment and housing autonomy, given that a higher share of rented dwellings implies a large 
supply of rental options and affordable pricing. On the side of the mortgage market, a widespread 
use of mortgages for purchasing homes is expected to positively moderate the relationship, because 
easier access to mortgages increases the ‘purchasing affordability’ of individuals. On the contrary, 
the ratio between residential loans and the disposable income of families is expected to negatively 
moderate the relationship, because a high ratio may indicate greater exposure of a household to 
financial vulnerability and to the risk of not repaying their debts (‘repayment affordability’). 
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3. Research design
3.1 Data and variables
The multilevel analyses presented here are based on individual cross-sectional data of the 
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2014. The database contains 
individual-level observations for 28 European countries, which qualifies data as multilevel with 
individuals at level one, nested in countries at level two. The sample used for the individual-level 
regressions is made up of individuals aged 16 to 29 years old, who are employed or unemployed. 
Inactive individuals are excluded in order to reduce the noise due to their internal heterogeneity 
based on gender, by which inactive women tend to be more residentially autonomous than men. 
Students, as a subset of the inactive population, are also excluded because the main purpose of the 
analysis is to investigate the relationship between (involuntary) labour market exclusion, namely 
unemployment, and housing autonomy.
 
The dependent variable, housing autonomy, refers to the residential condition of the individual: 
an individual is considered as having reached housing autonomy when he/she lives in a household 
not including his/her parents (variable equal to 1 if parents are not members of the household, 
equal to 0 otherwise). This operationalisation of housing autonomy is far from exhaustive and 
encompassing, as it does not take into account several types of residential arrangements that may 
occur in real life (e.g. living with siblings, friends or with other relatives). Moreover, it statistically 
underestimates the residential autonomy of individuals who are married and live with their family 
of origin or with parents-in-law1. However, despite being a rather crude definition, focussing on 
the presence or absence of at least one parent in the household serves our main purpose, which 
is not autonomy per se but residential autonomy from the family of origin, as a fundamental step 
toward adult life and other relevant steps toward adulthood.
The main independent variable is labour market exclusion, operationalised as a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 if the self-reported economic status if the respondent is unemployed, equal to 
0 if employed.
The logistic regressions also include a set of control variables such as age, gender, immigration 
status, level of education, area of residence (urban or rural). Finally, since housing autonomy is 
strongly associated with cohabitation with a partner (Iacovou, 2010; Ruspini, 2015), which may 
represent the main driver of the decision to live independently but also a buffer in case of labour 
market exclusion, we introduced the presence of a partner in the household as a further control.
 
One of the limitations to the use of cross-sectional data is that we cannot exclude a reverse 
causation problem, more specifically, establish which is the direction of the relationship between 
employment and housing autonomy because the current living condition of the individual may 
itself affect his/her employment condition. With cross-sectional data, we are indeed able to 
observe the characteristics of individuals who are already out of parental homes, but we do not 
know the conditions under which the individuals took the decision to exit their parental homes. 
However, while we acknowledge this limitation, we are also aware that extensive availability of 
high-quality longitudinal data for all European Member States is lacking. 
The macro-level indicators used in the second level regression are collected from official sources 
such as Eurostat, OECD and the European Mortgage Federation. The macro-level variables used 
are summarised here below (a detail of values of macro-level indicators per each EU28 country is 
provided in Table A.1 of the appendix):
1         This residential arrangement represents a very limited case (less or equal to 1%) in Western European countries, while 
it is a little more frequent (less or equal to 5%) in some European (mainly Eastern but not only) countries such as Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia.
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Table 1: List of macro level indicators
Hypothesis Macro-level indicator Source
Hypothesis 1.
Passive LMP
LMP expenditure as percentage of GDP:
Passive labour market policies (categories 8-9)
OECD
Participant stocks as a percentage of the labour 
force:
(Passive measures: categories 80-90) 2
OECD 
LMP expenditure per active population3:
Passive labour market policies (categories 8-9)
Eurostat
Expenditure on unemployment benefits as a % 
of GDP:
Full unemployment benefits
Eurostat
Hypothesis 2.
Housing and 
Mortgage Market
Share of the rental sector of the total housing 
market: % tenant Eurostat
Share of owners without mortgage of the total 
housing market Eurostat
Total Outstanding Residential Loans to GDP 
Ratio 
European Mortgage 
Federation (EMF)
Total Outstanding Residential Loans to 
Disposable Income of Household Ratio
European Mortgage 
Federation (EMF)
3.2 Method
Multilevel analysis on housing autonomy has been performed using a two-step approach. As recently 
highlighted in the literature (Bryan & Jenkins, 2013, 2016; Heisig, Schaeffer, & Giesecke, 2017), this 
method turns out to be particularly useful when the researcher has a dataset characterised by a 
relatively small number of macro-level units but a relatively high number of observations within 
each group (countries). 
Two-step approaches have an additional advantage: cross-country studies, like the one proposed 
here, are based on the ‘invariant coefficients assumption’, which neglects the cross-country 
variation in the effect of control variables at the lower level. This may reduce the precision of 
estimated context effects, resulting in low statistical power. However, recent research has showed 
that two-step approaches “generally produced accurate statistical inference /…/ and relatively high 
precision when clusters were large and when there was substantial heterogeneity in the effects of 
controls” (Heisig et al., 2017, p. 823).
The first step involves the estimation of individual level regressions between the dependent and 
independent variables, separately for each country. Such a coefficient, estimated in the first step 
for each country, becomes the dependent variable in the second step, which entails estimating 
the effect of the macro-level variable (independent) on the coefficient of the individual level 
relationship (dependent variable) through a linear regression model. The process requires an 
additional adjustment of standard errors, which in the case of estimated dependent variables 
tends to be biased and inconsistently estimated due to the heteroscedasticity of the first-level 
sampling error, where variance differs across observations (Jusko, 2005; Lewis & Linzer, 2005). 
Following Bryan & Jenkins (2013, p. 9), the first step can be represented as follows: 
2        Category 8 (or 80) indicates Out-of-work income maintenance and support; category 9 (or 90) indicates Early retirement 
measures.
3        Here we divided the amount of expenditure on passive labour market policies per the total of active population in each 
country. Thus, the indicator gives a rough estimate of the amount of PLMP potentially available to each active member of the 
population. However, real chances of access are not considered and may be influenced by the design of the policies.
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where v_c is a fixed effect for country c which combines both observed and unobserved country 
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c
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where (v
c
 ) ̂ is an estimate of the country-specific fixed effect and η
c
 is a residual error term.
In our case, we first estimated the country-level logistic regressions, with the dependent variable 
being residentially autonomous (not living with parents) and the independent variable the proxy 
for labour market exclusion (being unemployed), with controls included. We then estimated the 
average marginal effects, which turn into the dependent variable of a linear regression model 
in the second step, where the independent variable is the macro level indicator of interest (e.g. 
fraction of the rental sector for the hypothesis on the structure of the housing market). Finally, 
standard errors of this second regression are corrected in order to take into consideration the 
uncertainty coming from using an estimated dependent variable. The error term of the second step 
regression includes a first component due to the individual-level regression (heteroscedasticity 
due to variance in the sampling error across countries) and a second component is the country-
level error term. Thus, standard errors of the second step linear regression model are corrected by 
adding a weight that is computed as in (Huber, 2005) and Baranowska & Gebel (2008). 
4. Findings
In this section, we present the results emerging from the two-step multilevel regression for 
the moderating role of selected macro-level factors on the association between labour market 
exclusion and housing autonomy. 
As a first step, we present results from the logistic regressions run at individual level for each 
country. Figure 2 illustrates the average marginal effect of being unemployed (vs. being employed) 
on autonomous living in all 28 Member States in the year 2014 (Table A.2 in the Appendix shows 
regression coefficients). The regressions show that in the great majority of the EU28 countries, 
being unemployed is negatively associated with a condition of autonomous living (compared to 
those who are employed). The association is substantial and statistically significant for half of the 
countries considered: in Denmark, Estonia, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania4, Luxemburg, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden, the gap in the chances of living 
autonomously for unemployed young people is between 5 and 10 percentage points lower than 
for employed people. This negative relationship is also observable in Cyprus, Spain, Hungary and 
Poland, but with a lower gap (less than 5 percentage points) in the chances of living autonomously 
between the two groups. On the contrary, Malta stands out as an outlier, indicating an advantage 
for unemployed people, however, this finding might be affected by the small sample size. The 
remaining countries show an insignificant relationship between unemployment and housing 
autonomy, with extremely low and non-significant coefficients5.
4        The estimates for Lithuania and Latvia are not statistically significant (respectively p-value equal to 0.12 and 0.079) but 
have been included in the group following a less restrictive approach to p-value, also in light of the small sample size of the 
two countries (Bernardi, Chakhaia, & Leopold, 2016).
5         In this respect, it has to be considered that with cross-sectional data we cannot get rid of a reverse causation problem, 
as we are able to observe the characteristics of individuals who are already out of parental home, but we do not know the 
conditions under which the individual took the decision to exit the parental home.
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Figure 1: Average marginal effect of being unemployed (vs. employed) on housing autonomy
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 – version 2 of August 2016
Given this overview of the relationship occurring at an individual level (step 1), we can now test 
whether some of the country variation can be explained by structural and institutional features.
One of the advantages of the two-step approach is that it provides a clear visualisation of the 
multi-level relationship between micro and macro-level variables in a simple scatterplot. In Figures 
2 to 4, we plot the average marginal effects calculated at the individual level with the macro-level 
indicators of interests for each of the hypothesis considered. Here below we examine in detail 
each of the formulated hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Passive labour market policies 
Starting with hypothesis 1, about the positive moderating effect of Passive Labour Market Policies, 
we can see that a clear linear relationship cannot be observed (Figure 2), contrary to what was 
hypothesised. Indeed, the average marginal effects of the single countries are scattered across the 
different levels of expenditure and coverage for passive labour market policies, without indicating 
a clear relationship. The upper left graph shows a positive trend of decreasing the negative effect 
of unemployment on housing autonomy for increasing levels of expenditure in PLMP, but only 
for a limited group of OECD countries. A subgroup of countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, but also 
Denmark, France and the Netherlands), show negative and substantial associations between 
unemployment and housing autonomy despite high levels of PLMP expenditure. Similarly, when 
considering the ratio between public expenditure in LMP (in euros) and active population in all 
EU28 Member states (lower right corner), a group of countries emerges with very low levels of 
expenditure (<500 euros per active population member) but very heterogeneous outcomes in terms 
of unemployment and housing autonomy (left side of the graph).
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These preliminary considerations are further confirmed by the estimates of the second step 
regression (Table 2), which show extremely small and statistically insignificant relationships 
accompanied by insignificant R squared values. We also tested the same relationship with lagged 
variables (years 2013 and 2012), to take into consideration a possible delay in the effect of labour 
market policies. However, the estimates keep showing a non-significant relationship.
Thus, from the analyses performed on the selected indicators for the level of expenditure on Passive 
labour Market policies in a country, we cannot support the hypothesis of a positive moderating 
role of the association between labour market exclusion and autonomous living for youth. 
 
Figure 2: Passive labour market policies indicators and average marginal effect of being unemployed 
on housing autonomy
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 and OECD, Eurostat data
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Table 2: Second step regression for macro-level PLMP indicators and the association between 
unemployment and housing autonomy. Linear regression coefficients
Passive Labour Market Policies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expenditure in PLMP (%GDP) [OECD] 0.00115
(0.0140)
Participant stocks in PLMP (%LF) 
[OECD] 
0.000934
(0.00258)
Expenditure on full unemployment 
benefits 
0.000251
(0.0157)
Expenditure in PLMP (per active 
population) [Eurostat] 
-8.28e-06
(1.46e-05)
Observations 21 17 28 27 27 26
R-squared 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. 
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 and OECD, Eurostat data
Hypothesis 2. Housing and mortgage market
Figure 3 provides a visualisation of the relationship between the average marginal effects of 
being unemployed on the chances of living autonomously and the macro-level indicators selected 
as proxies for the structure of the housing market (Figure 3). Again, the relationship is not 
straightforward but some of the indicators seem to show a weak moderating effect. Indeed, a 
negative moderating role of the level of indebtedness of families can be spotted in the second 
graph, with marginal effects ordered in a somehow descending order. On the contrary, a positive 
moderating role of the share of owners with no mortgage, reducing the negative effect of 
unemployment and housing autonomy, seems to be observable for some of the countries in the 
fourth frame. Last, excluding some outliers, increasing shares of people living in a rented dwelling 
seem to be loosely associated with a weaker effect of unemployment on housing autonomy (third 
frame). 
We, therefore, tested these relationships in the second step regression (Table 3), which confirms 
some of the intuitions. Indeed, the proxy for the level of indebtedness of households (Residential 
Loans on DisposableIncome of Household Ratio) shows a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, accompanied by a substantial value of r-squared (models 2 and 3), which indicates 
a negative moderating role of the level of indebtedness of households. Namely, increasing levels 
of the ratio between mortgages and disposable income further worsen the negative relationship 
between unemployment and housing autonomy. This result partly contradicts our hypothesis of a 
positive moderating role of easier access to the mortgage market. Indeed, higher levels of exposure 
to debt turn to further worsen the negative relationship between unemployment and the housing 
autonomy of youth. Searching for a possible explanation of this result, we have to consider that in 
literature the proxy we used for the level of household debt may also highlight some problems in 
household budget management (Lacan & Lazarus, 2015; Marron, 2012). If the share of residential 
loans to disposable income increases, people can be exposed to over indebtedness, which means 
being exposed to such a high debt level that it exceeds the ability to repay it. In this situation, not 
only does the risk of not repaying their debts increase (‘repayment affordability’), but also the 
income availability of individuals can decrease, with relevant consequences for the possibilities 
of being independent in terms of finances and housing. In fact, a high ratio of debts to disposable 
income can expose people to financial vulnerability, distress, and the inability to be autonomous 
while unemployed, taking into account the possibility of facing household expenses. Moreover, 
we do not have evidence that a developed credit market assures access to youth in particular, who 
are our specific population of interest: the credit market could indeed be open, but it may be open 
mainly to other categories of customers, different from young people with low experience in the 
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labour market and a low level of salary. 
On the contrary, in line with what was hypothesised for the structure of the housing market, the 
share of population living in a rented dwelling seems to have a small but positive moderating 
effect, thus weakening the (negative) effect of unemployment on housing autonomy. This positive 
association assumes a very small value but becomes slightly significant and assumes a reasonable 
r-squared (12%) when excluding the two extreme cases of Malta and Sweden. Finally, the proxy 
introduced as an indicator of a predominant homeownership culture, associated with a poorly 
developed mortgage market (corresponding to high share of owners with no mortgage), shows 
neither a significant nor a substantial association, despite the graphs suggesting a positive 
moderating effect for a subset of countries.
 
Figure 3: Indicators for the structure of the housing and mortgage market and average marginal 
effect of being unemployed on housing autonomy
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 and European Mortgage Federation, Eurostat data
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Table 3: Second step regression for macro-level indicators of the housing market and the association 
between unemployment and housing autonomy. Linear regression coefficients
Housing and 
Mortgage 
Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ratio of 
Residential
Loans to GDP
-0.000377
(0.000328)
Ratio of 
Residential 
Loans to 
Disposable 
Income of 
Household 
-0.000286**
(0.000138)
-0.000407***
(0.000129)
share of 
tenants 
0.000915
(0.000753)
0.00119+
(0.000642)
share of 
owners with 
no mortgage 
0.000125
(0.000326)
0.000454
(0.000324)
Observations 28 27 26 28 26 28 26
R-squared 0.048 0.146 0.293 0.054 0.125 0.006 0.076
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1. Model 3 excludes Romania; 
Model 5 excludes Malta and Sweden; Model 7 excludes Malta and Romania. 
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 and OECD, Eurostat data
5. Conclusions
Autonomy from the parental home is considered a key transition into adulthood and a prerequisite 
for further transitions into adult life. Despite the youth having been disproportionately affected 
by recent developments in the labour market compared to adult workers, showing higher risk of 
unemployment, precarious employment and discontinuous careers, the patterns of transition out 
of parental homes differ among youth in different European countries. The mechanisms at play in 
this process can be multiple, but research has shown that the institutional setting can influence the 
set of opportunities that the youth face. In this paper, we focused on two particular institutional 
and structural features, investigating whether and to what extent passive labour market policies 
and the structure of the housing market may play a moderating role on the relationship between 
labour market exclusion and youth housing autonomy. 
Using a multilevel approach on individual data from EU-SILC and macro-level data from Eurostat, 
OECD and the European Mortgage Federation, we tested two hypotheses. First, we tested whether 
it holds true that the more generous the unemployment protection is (both in expenditure and 
in coverage), the weaker is the negative effect of unemployment on housing autonomy. Second, 
we tested whether a configuration of the housing market offering more rental opportunities and 
easier access to mortgages may weaken the impact of unemployment on housing autonomy. 
The major findings emerging from the multilevel analyses show that the level of expenditure on 
passive labour market policies, as well as the level of coverage of these policies, do not have a 
significant moderating role, namely, the association between the level of expenditure in passive 
labour market policies is not significantly associated with a lower effect of unemployment on 
housing autonomy. Therefore, this finding does not support hypothesis 1, according to which we 
expected that more generous expenditure on measures for supporting the incomes of unemployed 
people may help reduce the negative association between unemployment and the housing 
autonomy. However, this result has to be interpreted also considering the design of the passive 
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labour market policies, which in many countries have restricted criteria of access that exclude 
youth from the beneficiaries. Indeed, as mentioned in the discussion section, the used macro-
level indicators provide information about the amount of measures potentially available to the 
entire active population. Access, however, may vary considerably among countries, excluding (or 
including) particular groups, based on a previous job (excluding new entrants) or on characteristics 
of the last job (penalising discontinuous and precarious careers). Further research investigating 
qualitative characteristics of the access and coverage of passive labour market policies may help 
shed light on the underlying mechanisms.  
As far as the second hypothesis is concerned, findings show that the structure of the housing 
market does moderate the association between youth exclusion from the labour market and their 
housing autonomy, as hypothesised. Although the magnitude of the association remains limited, 
this result highlights the relevance of the structure of the housing market on youth autonomy, in 
particular, in presence of low labour market attachment. This issue has to be seriously taken into 
account in the design of policies to support young people. This result is also in line with previous 
research studies that refer to “greater problems of affordability, reduced investment in social 
housing and the need for higher deposits in a more risk-averse economic environment as key 
factors affecting the ability to leave home” (Bugeja-Bloch, 2012). It would be interesting to expand 
this avenue of research by further analysing which specific measures may contribute to making 
housing more affordable to young people and the different configurations of affordability that can 
be considered. More widespread social housing and economic support for rented dwellings are 
measures that can act on the possibility of young people to have access to houses at affordable 
costs. On the contrary, acting on purchase affordability, making mortgage more accessible – for 
example, with the provision of institutional guarantee funds – can have an unforeseen effect on 
the repayment affordability, the possibility for people to repair their debts, overall in a system of 
easy access to credit and high level of over indebtedness. In fact, we found that the level of family 
debt negatively moderates, i.e. further worsens, the relationship between unemployment and the 
housing market, even when controlling for PLMP expenditure and the structure of the housing 
market.
Finally, regarding the positive moderating relationship between a higher share of tenants and 
the effect of unemployment on housing autonomy, we can advance some considerations on the 
transmission of inequalities. Indeed, the link between unemployment and housing autonomy 
can be viewed also in terms of housing pressure, namely the weight of housing expenses on the 
household budget. Indeed, we can consider a high share of owners as a proxy for intergenerational 
transmission of wealth through the house: without mortgage or rent to be paid, the housing 
pressure is lower and young people can decide (and afford) to live autonomously also in case of 
low market attachment, thanks to the availability of a dwelling property of their family of origin. 
This situation raises important issues of intergenerational inequalities based on the distribution 
of wealth in a specific country, as young people who cannot benefit of such an option are further 
disadvantaged, and it is a domain that is less subject to alleviation with appropriate policies.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Summary of macro-level indicators
Source: OECD, Eurostat, EMF for the year 2014
Passive Labour Market Policies Structure of the Housing and Mortgage 
Market
Country Expenditure
on PLMP 
(%GDP)
[OECD]
Participant 
stocks 
in PLMP 
(%LF) 
[OECD]
Expenditure
on full 
unemployment 
benefits 
(%GDP)  
[Eurostat]
Expenditure
on PLMP 
per
active 
population 
(€)
[Eurostat]
Residential 
Loans on 
GDP Ratio 
[EMF]
Residential 
Loans on 
Disposable 
Income of 
Household 
Ratio 
[EMF]
share of 
tenants 
(%) 
[Eurostat]
share of 
owners, 
no 
mortgage 
(%) 
[Eurostat]
AT 1.40 7.2 0.80 1083.98 27.5 44.7 42.8 31.9
BE 1.94 15.7 1.60 1578.82 49.3 84.6 28.0 29.1
BG 0.40 53.02 8.2 13.9 15.7 81.5
CY 0.70 373.00 67.0 103.9 27.1 53.6
CZ 0.22 2.2 0.20 67.47 18.3 32.6 21.1 60.7
DE 0.94 6.7 0.80 667.57 42.4 66.3 47.5 25.8
DK 1.40 5.5 0.90 1310.60 90.0 185.5 36.7 13.8
EE 0.39 0.20 118.74 30.4 56.5 18.5 62.1
EL 0.51 0.40 192.99 39.1 58.6 26.0 60.7
ES 2.45 11.1 1.80 1112.94 56.3 87.2 21.2 46.7
FI 1.82 11.3 2.10 1427.03 43.7 73.1 26.8 30.1
FR 2.00 13.2 1.60 1465.92 43.1 66.4 35.0 33.6
HR 0.40 89.99 18.3 27.5 10.3 85.4
HU 0.26 4.3 0.10 62.02 16.4 29.5 11.8 70.2
IE 1.79 16.4 1.70 1647.85 48.5 106.4 31.4 33.8
IT 1.54 5.4 0.70 994.61 22.3 32.6 26.9 55.8
LT 0.20 48.05 16.3 26.1 10.1 82.3
LU 0.74 3.9 0.60 1432.02 51.2 145.4 27.5 29.9
LV 0.36 0.40 87.25 19.9 33.6 19.1 71.5
MT 0.30 131.02 44.4 20.0 60.1
NL 1.97 9.8 1.60 1509.06 95.7 195.9 33.0 7.7
PL 0.31 2.5 0.10 74.14 20.1 33.3 16.5 72.7
PT 1.33 6.9 1.20 461.72 59.1 84.7 25.1 39.4
RO 0.10 22.27 6.7 12.6 3.8 95.5
SE 0.61 5.1 0.40 530.47 78.8 152.3 30.7 7.9
SI 0.63 0.40 238.33 14.3 23.2 23.3 66.5
SK 0.35 2.1 0.20 97.06 23.0 37.3 9.7 79.4
UK 0.20 71.3 110.9 35.6 27.3
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Table A.2: Logistic regression on labour market status and housing autonomy (coefficients)
Source: own elaboration on EUSILC UDB 2014 – version 2 of August 2016. Notes: Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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